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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW-STRIKES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES-THE
INVALIDITY OF THE PROHIBITION
In the area of labor relations, few subjects have summoned forth as
much discussion from commentators and legislative committees, and as
little explanation from courts of last resort, as the subjects of collective
bargaining by public employees and the right, or lack thereof, of these
employees to strike in support of such collective bargaining or to strike
for the right to collectively bargain with their governmental employers.
Commentators and legislators are drawn to these problems for several
reasons. First, there is no apparent solution to the problems arising in this
area under present policies-although a state may prohibit, or at-
tempt to prohibit, public employees from striking, it is impossible to
satisfactorily legislate a dispute out of existence.' Secondly, the mass
work stoppages of recent years, especially those resulting from strikes of
"essential" public employees, 2 have evoked a sense of urgency in the
public. Finally, the numerical strength of public employees is forcing the
issue before the legislatures.' At present there are approximately twelve
million civilian public employees, 4 twice the number of persons in public
service in 1950; by 1975, it is estimated that one of every five employees
will work for a governmental body or agency at the federal, state or local
level. 5
The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees has claimed the most rapid increase in membership of any labor
organization in the country in recent years.8 Commensurate with the
statistics defining growth both in numbers of civil service employees and
in their membership in labor organizations, is the recent trend toward
1. Anderson, Disputes Affecting Government Employees, 10 LAB. L.J. 707, 711
(1959).
2. "Essential," as it is commonly used with respect to public employees, denotes
those persons responsible for the public health and safety, such as police and fire
personnel.
3. See Moran, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-Massachusetts Style,
52 MAss. L.Q. 153 (1967).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1968 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 80, table 41.
5. Moran, supra note 3.
6. Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the Future? 18
LAB. L.J. 127, 729 (1967).
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the establishment of collective bargaining policies for such employees.
Although such policies are often very limited in scope in comparison to
those used in the private sector, the states, both by statute7 and by judicial
pronouncement, 8 are presumably following the recent adoption of such
policies by the federal government. 9
The purpose of this comment is threefold: to discuss collective bargain-
ing in the public sector; to demonstrate the relationship between collective
bargaining and the strike in the public sector; and to evaluate the continued
denial of the right to strike. Although the strike issue is not new, the
objections to the strike are becoming obscured as the problem outgrows the
insufficient, idiomatic "solutions" which have stifled the courts and legis-
latures thus far. This comment will thus discuss the interrelationship be-
tween collective bargaining and the strike in the public sector for the
purpose of indicating and proposing resolutions for the seemingly incon-
sistent policies which have arisen as the "right" to bargain collectively with
their employers has been "granted" to public employees while the "right"
to strike in support of a bargaining position has been absolutely and uni-
versally denied. Such inconsistent policies have yielded unusual results:
The experience in Michigan following the passage of its Public Employment Rela-
tions Act suggests that, if anything, the introduction of collective bargaining rights
to public employment in an already highly unionized state might cause an increase
in work stoppages. In the first year under the Michigan act, there were twelve
strikes by municipal employees; in the previous seventeen years there had been
only thirteen. 10
Those states, therefore, which had viewed the granting or affirmative rec-
ognition of the right of collective bargaining as a panacea for the claimed
ills of public employees must continue to contend with the problem which
they presumably had intended to solve-the strike, and resultant work
stoppages.
7. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.040 (1962); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West
Supp. 1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-468 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 1309 (Supp. 1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd 1969);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 980 (Supp. 1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149,
§ 178F (Supp. 1969); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 423.215 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 179.50 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.510 (Supp. 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:3 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. Civ. SERV.
LAW § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.740 (1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-1 (1967); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-02 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.100 (Supp.
1969); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-266 (1967).
8. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, 138
Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ. of City of Chicago, 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
9. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 comp.).
10. Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67
MIcH. L. REV. 943, 945 (1969) (emphasis added).
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STATUS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Rather than describe the recent enactments granting collective bargaining
fights as reflective of a trend in the law or as evidence of an existing right,
it would be more accurate to characterize them as creating rights which
had not heretofore existed in such jurisdictions." Although collective
bargaining has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a
fundamental right 2 inherent in the right of private employees to organize,
state courts have refused to recognize the inclusion of the former right in
the latter when discussing the rights of public employees.' 3  A recent
Illinois case, however, has recognized the existence of the right of public
employees to bargain collectively with their employers, absent a statute
prohibiting such bargaining.' 4  Collective bargaining, in this sense, is
limited by the nature of the employer rather than by a statute which re-
stricts such bargaining.
The traditional argument underlying the denial of the right to bargain
is that since the public employer is a creature of statute and is thereby
limited by such statute, the entering into of an agreement whereby the
employer promises to negotiate or bargain with regard to the policies by
which it carries on its statutory duties constitutes an illegal delegation of its
authority.15 It has been suggested, however, that the progress made in
New York toward a permissive policy in this area was not the result of
the inapplicability of the "delegation" argument, but rather it resulted
from the practicalities of the situation. In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy,
the Supreme Court of New York applied the illegal delegation rationale:
Collective bargaining has no place in government service. The employer is the
whole people. It is impossible for administrative officials to bind the government of
the United States or the state of New York by any agreement made between them
and representatives of any union. Government officials and employees are governed
and guided by laws which must be obeyed and which cannot be abrogated or set
aside by any agreement of employees and officials.'6
Thirteen years after this unequivocal denial of bargaining rights to public
employees, the New York Supreme Court upheld a collective bargaining
agreement between the bargaining representative of the transit workers
and the New York Transit Authority.' 7 This change of position was
11. See, e.g., Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 335 P.2d 905 (1960); Miami Waterworks Local No.
654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946).
12. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 259 (1949).
13. See Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
14. Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,
supra note 8.
15. Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
16. 180 Misc. 868, 876, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
17. Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346,
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thought to have been inspired by fear of another strike such as the one
preceeding the Murphy case.' 8
In 1951, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in Norwalk
Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Education of City of Norwalk,19 the leading
case holding strikes by public employees to be unlawful, issued a declara-
tory judgment which recognized the public school teachers' rights to bargain
as a unit with their employer, absent prohibiting legislation:
There is no objection to the organization of the plaintiff as a labor union, but if its
organization is for the purpose of "demanding" recognition and collective bargaining
the demands must be kept within legal bounds. . . . [Tihis means nothing more than
that the plaintiff may organize and bargain collectively for the pay and working con-
ditions which it may be in the power of the board of education to grant.20
Within this final phrase lies the basis of the "delegation" argument which
had been so frequently employed to deny completely the right to bargain.
Today, however, the "delegation" argument serves no purpose where
legislatures have provided for some form of collective bargaining for
public employees. Notwithstanding the freedom with which a court may
dispense the right to bargain in areas not covered by the more limited
statutes,2' there remains the existence of one limiting factor-where bar-
gaining extends into areas which have been preempted by statute or rule, 22
there is nothing with which the negotiating employer has to bargain. For
example, Michigan's Hutchinson Act 23 imposes a duty upon public em-
ployers to bargain collectively with their employees with respect to wages,
hours and conditions of employment. Although wages and hours may be
determined by rules imposed upon the employer, it is impossible to imagine
a statute which specifically defines all conditions of employment. 24 In a
recent case, Chief Justice DeBruler of the Indiana Supreme Court quoted
151 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1956). See generally SPERO, GOVERNMENT As EM-
PLOYER (1948).
18. Cornell, Collective Bargaining By Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 43 (1958).
19. Supra note 8.
20. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, supra note 8,
at 277, 83 A.2d at 485-86. (emphasis added).
21. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 111%, § 328a (1967) (permits collective
bargaining to transit workers); 7 Wyo. STAT. ANN. ch. 14 § 27-266 (1967) (permits
collective bargaining to firefighters under very strict limitations).
22. "Although executive and administrative officers may be vested with a cer-
tain amount of discretion and may be authorized to act or make regulations in ac-
cordance with certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making such
standards involves the exercise of legislative powers. Thus qualifications, tenure,
compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly
matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract." City
of Springfield v. Clouse, supra note 15, at 1251, 206 S.W.2d at 545.
23. MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-216 (1967).
24. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.740 (1967).
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from a policy statement of a city school board which stated:
Be it resolved, that the Board of School Trustees of the School City of Anderson
will professionally negotiate with the Anderson Federation of Teachers with regards
to employment salary schedules, grievance procedures, working conditions and ad-
ministrative policies.25
The amount of discretion resting in the Board of School Trustees serves to
discredit the "delegation" argument should an attempt be made to apply
it. Where there is such discretion in a governmental agency operating
under a statute permitting collective bargaining, there is no reason why
such discretion should not be carried to the bargaining table. In a state
such as Illinois, which has held that the right to bargain collectively exists
independent of statute,26 there is no reason why discretionary matters
may not be agreed upon by the employer and the employee within the
bounds of that discretion, absent a statute prohibiting such bargaining.
The remaining minority of states27 which have refused to recognize any
bargaining rights constitutes the repository of the "delegation" argument.
This argument serves merely to exclude from the bargaining table those
matters which are within the control of the employer; the rationale under-
lying this argument is outlined by Dean Seitz as:
(1) The fixing of conditions of work in the public service is a legislative function;
(2) Neither the executive nor the legislative body may delegate such functions to an
outside group; (3) The legislature or executive must be free to change the conditions
of employment at any time.28
If this statement is a correct evaluation 'of the duties of legislatures, then a
majority of the state legislatures in this country have abdicated their offi-
ces. Rather than submitting to this reasoning, legislatures have created
agencies in which the duties and powers necessary for the provision of
services have been vested-which obviously is delegation. The manner
in which such agencies operate must necessarily be free from absolute con-
trol by the legislature; if there were absolute control, there would be no
need for the agency. An inherent defect in the argument against collective
bargaining is the basic assumption that such bargaining is detrimental to
the operations of government. This assumption is without foundation."9
25. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, 18 Ind. 573, 580,
251 N.E.2d 15, 19 (1969).
26. Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago,
supra note 8.
27. See International Long-Shoremen's AFL-CIO Ass'n v. Georgia Ports
Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d 733 (1962); Wichita Public Schools Emp. U., Local
No. 513 v. Smith, 194 Kan. 2, 397 P.2d 357 (1964); Mugford v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Levasseur v. Wheeldon,
79 S.D. 442, 112 N.W.2d 894 (1962).
28. Seitz, Legal Aspects of Public School Teacher Negotiations and Participating
in Concerted Activities, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 487, 488 (1966).
29. See MosKow, TEAcHERS & UNIONS 93-114 (1966).
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Public employers, no less so than private industry, are incapable of uni-
laterally deciding what the terms and conditions of employment should be.
It is a proper exercise of its delegated powers for the governmental em-
ployer to determine policy, working conditions" ° and even improvements
in the service itself by means of collective negotiations. As was stated by
the court in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen: "In collective bargaining negotiations . . . the em-
ployer is free to reject demands if he determines that they are unaccepta-
able." 3' At the bare minimum, the policy expressed by this statement,
notwithstanding its implicit restriction of collective bargaining to a "sug-
gestion box" level, would at least open a door to the discussion of employ-
ment relations problems which might otherwise remain subliminal.
Rather than attempting to rebut the arguments which conclude with an
absolute denial of the right to bargain, the Labor Relations Section of the
American Bar Association has pointed to the evils of a system which
prohibits collective bargaining absolutely or which inhibits such bargain-
ing to a degree where it no longer resembles its counterpart in the private
sector:8 2
Government as employer has failed in many instances to do what it compels industry
to do. Legislatures which deny to government agencies the use of some proper form
of collective bargaining procedures so familiar in industry (at least in terms of "col-
lective" negotiation), which attempt to restrict unduly the right of employees to
organize and to petition the government for redress of their grievances, need to re-
view the problem more realistically.
It is a fallacy to assume that the usual so-called "Merit-system" laws governing the
civil services are so comprehensive that employees have no proper basis for complaint
as to their working conditions, or that their grievances are all superficial. Most of
such laws relate primarily, if not exclusively to the manner of appointment, promo-
tion, discharge and change in status. Occasionally they regulate classification of posi-
tions based on duties and responsibilities, as well as establish a basis for salary plans.
Laws governing employee relationships are usually less flexible in the public service
than is generally the rule in private employment.83
In the final analysis, collective bargaining should not be a "yes" or "no"
proposition in the public sector. It is a matter of degree in that collective
bargaining can exist in a limited yet meaningful form.8 4 While the scope
of collective bargaining must take into account the amount of power and
discretion vested in the employer, it must also be recognized that
30. Note, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 351 (1955).
31. 54 Cal. 2d 684, 693, 335 P.2d 905, 906 (1960).
32. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-105.530. Any collective bargaining
agreement reached is subject to legislative approval and adoption.
33. ABA SECTION ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROCEEDINGS (1955).
34. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.215 (1967); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW
§ 202 (McKinney Supp. 1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (Supp. 1969).
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government employees like their counterparts in private enterprise are subject to
the same vicissitudes of insecurity of employment, rising prices, accident, illness and
old age. Everywhere, from the remotest corners of the earth to the most sophisti-
cated, people seek to assert a measure of control over the conditions under which they
live.3 5
THE STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
While some form of collective bargaining has become accepted practice
in most states, the strike by public employees remains an outlawed form
of concerted activity. Although one state has conferred upon a certain
group of employees the right to strike,36 there is no indication of a trend in
that direction. The Supreme Court of Arizona distinguished between
employees of a governmental project which was "proprietary" in nature
and employees of government in the exercise of "governmental" functions.
This rationale was a throwback to the "sovereign immunity" doctrine of
torts"7 and has been rejected by every other state which has confronted
it. 38
The strike problem has become more intense in recent years and will
continue to plague the legislatures and courts until either a satisfactory
alternative to the strike is proposed, if one exists, or a limited right to
strike is recognized. There is an analogy between private and public em-
ployees. That this is true has been proved by the enactment of collective
bargaining statutes and by the successful results of "illegal" strikes. Stat-
utes, injunctions and fines have proven to be unsuccessful in compelling
compliance to the policy of prohibition. Legislation prohibiting all strikes
by public employees serves only to temporarily abate the symptoms while
it ignores the problems which underlie the strike situation.
The right of private employees to strike, although protected by federal
statute in the Norris-LaGuardia Act39 and in most states by "little Norris-
LaGuardia acts,"'40 has been subjected to a more desperate and violent
struggle than has the strike right in the public sector. Until 1932, strikers
35. Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB.
L.J. 685, 688 (1965).
36. IBEW v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
37. McGinley v. City of Cherryvale, 141 Kan. 155, 40 P.2d 377 (1935); Brum-
mett v. City of Jackson, 211 Miss. 116, 51 So.2d 52 (1951); City of Richmond
v. James, 170 Va. 553, 197 S.E. 416 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, supra note 11, at 694-95, 355 P.2d at 911 (dissenting opinion);
City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union,
52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
40. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-501 et. seq. (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 206a (1964).
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in private industry were effectively dealt with as conspirators, subjected
to criminal prosecution 41 and were often found to be in violation of the
Sherman Act.4 2 The strike issue in public employment has, in most in-
stances, arisen in cases wherein an injunction had been sought to restrain
public employees from striking.48 In all such cases, the anti-injunction
acts of the federal and state governments have been held inapplicable. In
the leading case of United States v. United Mine Workers of America,44
the United States Supreme Court held that where the government had
seized private mining operations under the War Labor Disputes Act, 45 em-
ployees of such operations were, in fact, employees of the government
and thus not within the protection afforded to them formerly as employees
in private industry under Norris-LaGuardia. The Court stated that such
restrictive statutes as Norris-LaGuardia "will not be applied to the sover-
eign without express words to that effect."'46 This case has been relied
upon by state courts47 in denying the protection of their anti-injunction
statutes to public employees.
Many states have, in response to the increasing number of public em-
ployee strikes, enacted statutes specifically prohibiting such activity.48
Unfortunately, as was seen in the Michigan situation49 where there was an
increase in work stoppages presumably resulting from a more permissive
legislative attitude toward collective bargaining, such statutes have merely
41. See generally TAYLOR, LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR LAW (2d ed. 1950).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
43. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
supra note 38; Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding,
32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School
City of Anderson, supra note 25; Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated
Assn., 85 Ohio App. 153, 85 N.E.2d 811 (1949); City of Minot v. General Drivers
and Helpers Union, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
44. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
45. Act of June 25, 1943, 57 Stat. 163.
46. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, supra note 34, at 272.
47. See Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, supra note 25;
City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59
(1957); School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance,
101 R.I. 243, 221 A.2d 806 (1966).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153e (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221
(1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 82-2 (1968); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178M (Supp. 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 17.455(2)
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT. § 105.530 (1966);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-821 (1960); N.Y. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT
ACT, § 210(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.760 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (1964); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-1 (Supp. 1968); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5154c(3)
(1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65 (1953); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(1) (Supp.
1969).
49. Anderson, supra note 10.
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provided the courts with a statutory basis for enjoining strikes.
BASES FOR THE STRIKE PROHIBITION
State court decisions denying the right to strike without the aid of
statutory prohibition, 50 although few in number, 51 contain the rational
bases for such prohibition and are, therefore, worthy of consideration and
analysis. Historically, strikes by public employees were few in number
and massive in proportion at the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
oft-quoted52 statement that:
[Militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government
employees. A strike by public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on
their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their demands
are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those
who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.53
This statement has become the "underlying basis for the policy against
strikes by public employees. ' 54  To state, however, that such strikes are
violative of public policy,55 illegal, 56 or treasonous, 57 is to state a conclu-
50. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, supra
note 38; Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, supra note
8; Miami Waterworks Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, supra note 11; Board of
Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2. v. Redding, supra note 43; Hansen v.
Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962); Minneapolis Federation of
Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966); New
Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. American Fed'n, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134
(1964); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, supra note 47; IBEW v.
Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956); School Committee of
City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, supra note 47; City of Alcoa
v. IBEW, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957); South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist.
of Int'l Longshoremens' Ass'n v. Harris County, 358 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
51. "Few cases involving the right of unions of government employees to strike
to enforce their demands have reached courts of last resort." Norwalk Teachers'
Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, supra note 8, at 274, 83 A.2d at
484.
52. See Comment, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 151, 152 (1966); Comment, 61 Nw.
U.L. REV. 105, 117-18 (1966).
53. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to L.C. Stewart, President,
National Federation of Federal Employees, August 16, 1937, in RHYNE, POWER OF
MUNICIPALITIES TO ENTER INTO LABOR CONTRACTS 24 (1941).
54. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, supra
note 43, at 571-72, 207 N.E.2d at 430.
55. City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, supra note 47.
56. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, supra
note 38; Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, supra
note 8; Miami Waterworks Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, supra note 11; Board
of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, supra note 43; Hansen
v. Commonwealth, supra note 50; Minneapolis Federation of Teachers Local 59 v.
Obermeyer, supra note 50; New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. American Fed'n, supra
note 50; City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, supra note 47; IBEW
sion rather than a rationale. In most cases which have reached courts
of last resort, the situation had reached a degree of magnitude where there
was cause for great concern. This point is demonstrated by the conclu-
sion of the New York Court of Appeals in Board of Education of the City
of New York v. Shanker, a case involving a general strike by New York
City teachers:
From time immemorial, it has been a fundamental principle that a governmental
employee may not strike. In this sensitive area, neither labor-the public em-
ployee-nor management-the governmental agency-in their mutual interdepend-
ence can afford the indulgence of arbitrary self-interest at the expense of the
public.6 8
It has been recently stated that the argument most strongly asserted in
denying the strike right to public employees is that such a right would result
in a delegation of powers to employees which properly belong to the
governmental agency. 59 This argument, however, is appropriate only
where the right to strike by public employees is proposed on the same basis
as that right exists in the private sector. Collective bargaining had formerly
been denied existence for this reason, but with few exceptions acceptance
in limited form has been given. A limited right to strike could similarly
avoid the defect of "delegation." Since no absolute right to strike exists
in the private sector,60 it would indeed be an extreme and untenable posi-
tion to maintain that public employees should have such unlimited right.61
Were the right to strike acceptable in the public sector, it would necessarily
be subject to those same restrictions which the government may impose
upon private employees. 62 Subjecting the public welfare to such a weapon
as a strike by its servants must be limited; yet strikes in the public sector
can be limited without prohibiting its use in every form, by every unit of
public employees, and in every situation.
It has been argued that a strike by public employees is a "[denial] of
the authority of government. '6 3 To violate any law is to deny the au-
thority of the government which imposed it. Absent the statutory pro-
v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 50; School Committee of City of Paw-
tucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, supra note 47; City of Alcoa v. IBEW,
supra note 50; South Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist. of Int'l Longshoremens' Ass'n v.
Harris County, supra note 50.
57. Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n, supra note 43.
58. 283 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (1967).
59. Comment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 105, 119 (1966).
60. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra note 12; Dorchy v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
61. Anderson, supra note 10, at 948.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1964); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1959).
63. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, supra note
8, at 276, 83 A.2d at 485.
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hibition, where is the denial? A strike by public employees for the pur-
pose of enforcing their reasonable demands within the statutory discretion
delegated to the employer is not a denial of the authority of government.
Rather, it is a means of compelling an employer to accede to certain de-
mands which are within the scope of its legally constituted duty of provid-
ing a certain service at a certain cost; that cost being a variable factor pro-
portionate to the breadth of the particular employer's discretion. To seek
to enforce demands, the satisfaction of which is beyond the power of the
employer to grant, would be to "deny the authority of government." In
such a case, the employer would have no control over the strike. The de-
mands would, of necessity, require satisfaction by an authority-ultimately
the legislature-to whom access by coercion of this type is impermissible
as an exception to the democratic process. Where the employer is called
upon to improve the lot of its employees and that objective is properly
within its power, the authority of government is not at issue. "The pri-
mary difficulty seems to be the common conception of a strike of govern-
ment employees as a general strike against 'the state' rather than a strike of
clerks in the Veterans' Bureau or of firemen in Brushville, Indiana."'6 4
However invalid the distinction between "governmental" and "proprie-
tary" functions of government might be, one distinction must be sustained.
The government, as sovereign, cannot be related to a private employer.
A public employee, however, for purposes of collective bargaining, is not
an agent of the state or a servant of the people-he is an employee.
A final argument of the conclusory type which denies the strike right
asserts "the sound and demanding notion that governmental functions may
not be impeded or obstructed. '65 This is a truism which merely restates
a difference between private and governmental employers but fails to
state why such a distinction is a basis for complete denial of the strike
right to the public employees. There is no compelling reason to deny,
absolutely, the right to strike to employees of a hospital operated by the
government while employees of a private hospital may strike with im-
punity, subject only to injunction in emergency situations. 6 This argu-
ment must fail, when employed to assert an absolute denial of the strike,
whenever employees of a governmental agency have counterparts in pri-
vate business and industry:
There is no difference in impact on the community between a strike by employees of
64. Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1941). See also Anderson Fed'n of
Teachers v. School City of Anderson, supra note 25 (dissenting opinion).
65. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, supra
note 43, at 572, 207 N.E.2d at 430 (1965).
66. St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 264 Wis. 396,
59 N.W.2d 448 (1953).
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a public utility and employees of a private utility; nor between employees of a
municipal bus company and a privately owned bus company; nor between public
school teachers and parochial school teachers. The form of ownership and manage-
ment of the enterprise does not determine the amount of disruption caused by a
strike of the employees of that enterprise. 6 7
It has been suggested that this argument would be useful in limiting the
strike power of such private sector counterparts, 68 but in view of the ju-
dicial history of the private sector strike, such a prospect is unlikely.
The rationale underlying any argument which would deny rights to
public employees which are "fundamental"69 to private sector employees
must contain a rational basis for distinguishing between the sectors.
While the above arguments-sovereignty, public policy, denial of the au-
thority of government, and the nonexistence of the right to impede the
functions of government-may serve to limit, incidentally, the right of
public employees to strike, two arguments have been made which, be-
cause of their reasonable basis for distinction, must necessarily limit such
right: absence of the profit motive and the necessity that certain public
services not be interrupted.
In Board of Education of Community School District No. 2 v. Redding, °
the Illinois Supreme Court based its distinction between employers in the
public sector and those in the private sector on the absence of the profit
motive in the former. This is an essential difference. In private industry,
the balance sought to be achieved is the bargained-for sharing of the profits
by the employer and the employee. Since there is no profit in govern-
ment, it is argued, there must necessarily be no right to strike. This would
be a valid argument if raised in opposition to a proposal for the right to
strike in the public sector as it exists in the private sector-the so-called
"unlimited" right to strike. Employees in private industry are not limited
by law with respect to the reasonableness of their demands, but may de-
mand wage increases which, if agreed to by the employer, would result in
the failure of the employer's business. Absent a refusal to bargain on the
part of the bargaining representative, the employee may strike until such
increase is accepted by the employer or until the employer ceases to exist.
Such power in the hands of organized public employees would be, to say
the least, disastrous. However, to cite this as an absolute denial of the
right to strike is to reach a conclusion far beyond the force of the argument.
A strike power limited by a "reasonableness" requirement-a requirement
67. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers v. School City of Anderson, supra note 25, at
582, 251 N.E.2d at 21 (dissenting opinion).
68. Supra note 59, at 124.
69. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., supra note 12.
70. Supra note 43, at 567, 207 N.E.2d at 430 (1965).
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that no wage demand by public employees may exceed the wage rate of
employees similarly employed in the private sector-would be a partial
solution. This could, of course, apply only where the public employee has
a private sector counterpart. Where there is no counterpart, as in such
purely governmental functions as police and fire protection, the wage
standard may be predetermined by a committee composed of representa-
tives of the employer and the bargaining representative of the employees,
possibly before an appropriate legislative committee. Such determination
need not be different than the existing procedures employed in many states
today: arbitration, 71 binding arbitration,72 compulsory arbitration,7 and
legislative fact-finding.74  The "profit motive" argument has less force
when the issues involved in the dispute are noneconomic. Where the sub-
ject of bargaining is safety conditions, job security or general conditions of
employment, there is no reason to distinguish between public and pri-
vate sector employees except, again, to limit the demands of public em-
ployees to those matters which are within the discretion of the employer.
The strike has been labelled an "economic" weapon and therefore in-
applicable to the public sector because the governmental employer is not
ruled by the balance sheet. The striker in the private sector bases his ef-
fectiveness on his ability to motivate the employer to resolve the impasse
situation through fear of economic detriment resulting from a shutdown of
his operations. The prime concern of the public employer, aside from
inconvenience or danger to the public, is the political effect of the strike.
While the public employer suffers no economic loss, its officers must an-
swer to the public and to those persons to whom they owe political alle-
giance. The results which have been and are being effected by strikers
in the public sector refute the statement by one commentator that "since
this is a political matter, a system of political settlement is preferable to an
impasse resolution mechanism which depends upon economic coercion."'75
Preferable to whom? The same commentator also states, however, that
the "strikes, when they do occur, make the headlines because of their
great political-if not economic-impact on the public.17 6  The strike,
from the standpoint of the employee, is the appropriate method, but only
if used properly. Because of the difference between public and private
sector strikes, each must be utilized differently to achieve a different pur-
71. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-824 (1968).
72. See, e.g., R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-9, 29-9.4-10 (1969).
73. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MicH. L. REV. 931, 936-37
(1969).
74. N. Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
75. Anderson, supra note 10, at 954.
76. Anderson, supra note 10, at 947.
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pose. Private sector employees attempt to maximize the effect of the
strike by forcing losses upon the employer; the plant is shut down and
production ceases. The purpose of the public striker is not to incon-
venience or endanger the public, but to cause the employer to incur pub-
lic and official disfavor. Thus anything more than a moderate incon-
venience to the public is self-defeating. The public striker seeks to make
the headlines in such a way that his position is well publicized. This is
the inherent limitation on the strike: only good publicity will render the
strike effective--only reasonable demands will elicit good publicity.
The second reasonable basis for distinguishing between public and
private sector strikes is the "necessity that there be no interruption in the
operation of public functions because of the serious consequences which
would ensue."'77 This reasoning, although appropriate in all cases involv-
ing strikes by employees whose presence on the job is essential to public
health and safety, has been curiously absent in the majority of the deci-
sions. The argument, validly and properly sustaining limitations on the
right to strike, fails to sustain the absolute prohibition of a right to strike.
Were this argument to gain currency as the most practical basis for en-
joining a strike, its proponents would be hard-pressed to advocate the
continuance of the present prohibitive policy. Proponents of the limited
right to strike assert, as their basic proposition, that public employees
whose services are not "essential" to the public health and safety should
be permitted the use of the strike weapon. The Governor's Commission
to Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania, in its report of June,
1968, proposed such a policy:
There can be no right of public employees to strike if the health, safety or welfare of
the public is endangered ....
But where collective bargaining procedures have been exhausted and public health,
safety or welfare is not endangered it is inequitable and unwise to prohibit strikes.
The period that a strike can be permitted will vary from situation to situation. A
strike of gardeners in a public park could be tolerated longer than a strike of garbage
collectors. And a garbage strike might be permissible for a few days but not indefi-
nitely, and for longer in one community than another, or in one season than
another.78
Thus far, one court has confronted an argument of this type. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a differentiation between essential and non-
essential government services would be the subject of such intense and
never-ending controversy as to be administratively impossible. 79 The
77. City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, supra note 47, at 509-10,
131 A.2d at 61.
78. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LAW OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (June, 1968).
79. Delaware River & Bay Auth. v. Int'l Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots,
45 N.J. 138, 148, 211 A.2d 790, 794 (1965).
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degree of accuracy attainable in resolving such controversies is open to
question; although a certain degree of arbitrariness would still exist, the
arbitrary classification of policemen and zoo keepers as "essential" would
be abated.
An alternative to the categorization of services in terms of essentiality
would be to permit all public employees, with the exceptions of police and
fire prevention services whose essentiality is not questioned,80 the right to
strike under those limitations applicable to the private sector (i.e., the Taft-
Hartley provision for injunction in time of emergency). 8' Application of
labor relations statutes to public employees of the nonessential class would
have the double effect of utilizing workable standards for the definition of
the respective rights and duties of public sector employers and employees,
and also removing the arbitrary "prior restraint" method of attempting to
control labor disputes by across-the-board prohibition.82
CONCLUSION
Although the validity of the arguments offered to sustain the absolute
strike prohibition is continuously under attack, the practical results which
the policy has engendered must inevitably lead to its abolition or revision.
Under Executive Order 10,998,8 a labor organization which sanctions the
use of the strike by public employees may not be the bargaining repre-
sentative of a unit of federal employees. Nevertheless, the Executive
Board of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees, though not within the purview of the Order, issued the following
statement of policy which directly confronts uniform state policy and fed-
eral law:
[AFSCME] insists upon the right of public employees-except for police and other
law enforcement officers-to strike. To forestall this right is to handicap free col-
lective bargaining process . . . . [Wihere one party at the bargaining table pos-
sesses all the power and authority, bargaining becomes no more than formalized
petitioning.8 4
Such a statement, equating the need for the strike right in the public to that
80. Supra note 78.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1964).
82. "Public employees have been excluded from the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Act since its inception, and it has been understood that states
could legislate with respect to state and local employees. But until recently it
was generally thought that labor relations statutes were inappropriate for public
employees. This assumption is being subjected to increasingly critical analysis
today." Getman, Indiana Labor Relations Law: The Case for a State Labor Rela-
tions Act, 42 IND. L.J. 77, 80 (1967).
83. Supra note 9.
84. Clary, Pitfalls of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 18 LAB. W.
406, 408 (1967).
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in the private sector, combined with the failure of proposed and existing
alternatives to the strike, has brought the necessity of such an "ultimate
weapon" into clear perspective. So-called alternatives 5 to the strike are,
in practice, not alternatives but merely methods of minimizing the possi-
bility of the impasse-they should be regarded as nothing more. Improved
bargaining techniques, various forms of arbitration and mediation, and
even compulsory arbitration have been suggested and adopted. Were
these "alternatives" adequate for the purpose of preventing strikes they
would solve not only the strike problem in the public area, but also many
of the prolonged work stoppages occuring in private industry.
Absent a legitimate basis for granting strike immunity to the public
employer, a limited right to strike should be recognized; arguments which
require limitations upon such activity should not be continued in use as
vehicles for prohibiting strikes. Many of the arguments, when used to
prohibit the strike, are compelling when applied to police and fire pre-
vention officers; but when zoo keepers and street sweepers strike, courts
will find it more difficult to speak in terms of "paralysis" of government
and the "intolerable" nature of the situation. Allowing such distinctions
to be made by the courts is tantamount to demanding the use of arbitrary
standards. The distinctions to be made between employees in terms of
essentiality, while by no means clear-cut, should properly be subjected to
legislative determination. Within the public sector, essentiality of a
particular service would immediately draw most public employees into
certain, broad, predeterminable categories.
First, employees responsible for the public safety would be least affected
by the right to strike; such employees must be denied the use of such a
weapon. The only permissible alternative to legislative prohibition would
be impracticable: legislative silence on the strike issue with unlimited in-
junctive powers vested in the courts in such situations. Secondly, those
employees whose services are required in order to continue the operations
of government-employees of the courts, city halls, police departments-
who, while able to evade the denomination of essentiality, must be limited
in their use of the strike weapon because of the undue burden upon the
government qua government. The limitation in this case is based upon the
distinction between the employer as government and the government as
employer. While the right to strike should not be denied to such em-
ployees, it requires limitations. An appropriate limitation would be in the
form of a time stricture. Mechanics in a police motor pool, for example,
if permitted to strike for a week, might enter the ranks of the essential,
while continuous sallies of day-long strikes or walk-outs might impede the
85. See generally Kheel, supra note 73.
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functions of the department to such a degree that they would be consid-
ered merely as a serious inconvenience rather than a threat to public
safety. Third, those employees 6 whose duties involve service to the pub-
lic should be permitted to strike "subject to provisions reminiscent of the
Emergency Dispute procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act where the gov-
ernor of each state is given authority to invoke an 80-day cooling-off
period." T87  Finally, there are those employees--employees of public
parks, zoos, parking lots and golf courses-whose absence from work
would cause slight public inconvenience. While these employees would
suffer most by the strike, due to lack of public attention and concern, the
public would suffer little. Such employees should enjoy the right to
strike as it exists in the private sector.
Robert Karr
86. E.g., transit workers, teachers and highway maintenance personnel.
87. Note, 16 DEPAUL L. REV. 151, 164 (1966).
